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DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN AFTER-ACQUIRED
TITLE.
A. MISTAKEN AS COMMON LAW DOCTRINE.
WThen a rule of law has become well settled by the doctrine
of stare decisis it is second nature for courts to apply it to a
particular state of facts, and seldom do we find in the opinions
the underlying principles that have occasioned the need of the
rule. Rather is it the tendency to give no other reason than
that the law grew that way; and being justified on political,
social and economic grounds, have by strict application added
to the myriad of precedents. But such mechanic exercise is
interrupted when we find courts applying either another rule,
or refusing to apply the general rule to a similar state of facts.
Thus a precedent is established which challenges the ingenuity
and the learning of the courts who are so confronted with a
rule on which there is conflict of opinion. So drawing from
the learning of courts that have been so challenged, also from
learned text writers on the subject, is the purpose of this
article.
When in that period of history, civilization reached the
point where it became necessary for the admission of property
or the recognition of those things which by the laws of nature
every man is entitled to-it necessarily followed that rules
whereby each could assert his rights, must be devised. So the
first of these natural modes of acquisition was "Occupatio"
or the occupancy of those things, as the Roman lawyers called,
res nullius' '-things that have never had an owner.'
By the establishment of this rule man's independence be-
came recognized; and his importance was more or less asso-
ciated with his property rights. Naturally, then, those units
in possession were established, and as occupancy was the only
mark of rights, there was much abuse and injustice. So in
1. Maine's Ancient Law, page 238.
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order to assure the rights of these natural owners it also be-
came necessary to devise means for continuing possession.
Thus came the common assurances of the Kingdom,--the legal
evidences whereby every man was given his rights in contro-
versies,--which either prevented or removed difficulties. De-
scents as the means provided for the distribution among the
proper heirs, or the involuntary results in their favor, and
the power of alienation or voluntary transfer of "property
properly evidenced."
Descent, the vesting in the proper heirs the title of prop-
erty when it is left in the hands by the death of the owner, is
involuntary and the law acts for the absent party. The second
by acts inter vivos, voluntary transfer-a meeting of the minds
and a consideration. There has grown in the law what we
might term a third mode of transferring property,-that is
where title passes by operation of law between living persons
which may be voluntary on one side and involuntary on the
other as where one, who has no title at the time of making the
conveyance but later acquires good title, now tries to take ad-
vantage of the principle that a man cannot sell or grant that
Which he hath not and render the conveyance of no effect. But
the law holds that where parties have given expression to an
apparent intention by solemn deeds, which the law recognizes
as absolute, and behind such form one of the parties is guilty
of deceit by not revealing the truth, they are estopped from
now setting up the truth to defeat the lie.
"Estoppel," said Lord Coke,2, "is where a man by his own
acts or acceptances is precluded to say the truth, or falsehood
is made to appear the truth." As paradoxical as these state-
ments seem, their application carries out what has been well
said, that justice is not always done by the truth.
The doctrine of estoppel by deed as applied in after-ac-
quired title inuring to the benefit of the grantee and its com-
plication and application is a subject about which there have
been various conflicting opinions. The case of McCuster v.




McEvey presents a clear set of facts for the illustration of
the application of the doctrine and a learned dissenting opin-
ion.4 In that case one having no title to certain land attempts
to convey with warranty to A by deed duly recorded, and he
afterwards acquires a good title and conveys the land to B.
The purchaser of B is estopped to aver that the grantor was
not seized at the time of his conveyance to A the first grantee.
We shall examine the opinion of Judge Porter in this case,
for the purpose of bringing out the force of the arguments
against estoppel in after-acquired title. And to do this it will
be necessary to point out some of the characteristics of the
modes of conveyances to show that there is no sound basis in
the law for the doctrine.
Feoffments, fines and common recoveries, leases, releases,
bargain and sale, all grew out of the demands made by the in-
creasing complexities that progressing civilization presented.
It is not our purpose to examine each one in turn, but rather
to point out how a doctrine is born to meet ends of justice that
such modes could not reach.
As stated by Rawle,5 "it must be carefully observed that
there were only two classes of cases in which an estate thus
actually passed by estoppel, and two only. The first was
where the mode of assurance was a feoffment, a fine, or com-
mon recovery. Such was their high solemnity and high char-
acter that they always passed an actual estate, by right or by
wrong, and as against feoffer or conusor and his heirs, not
only divested them of what they then had, but of every estate
which they might thereafter acquire. The second is where the
assurances was by lease, under which it will be remembered,
estate could take effect in futuro; and the estoppel seems to
have been put upon the ground of such having been the con-
tract between the parties, the same contract which on the part
3. 9 R. I. 528.
4. 10 R. 1. 606.
5. Rawle, Covenants for Title, page 360; 5 Man. & Rye. 202; 10 Barn. &
Cres. 181.
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of the lessor implied a covenant for quiet enjoymemt from the
word 'demiseI and on the part of the lessor implied covenant
for payment of the rent from the words 'yielding and pay-
ing.' 1 7
It will be observed in this connection that such assurances
of the first class by which estoppel was allowed-that is feoff-
ment, fine and common recovery-it did not depend on any
covenants but by the open and notorious character and high
order of the ceremony it was deemed best not to allow such
to be afterwards made of no effect; and therefore passed all
that the feoffer or conusor had or might ever after acquire.
It was only by the doctrine of rebutter which sprang from
the common law warranty, that by reason of such warranty a
grantor and his heirs were precluded from setting up after-
acquired title. And from Rawle's statements of the second
assurances which actually passed title by operation of law,
we see that the force depended upon the covenants for quiet
enjoyment implied from the word "demise," and in this re-
spect was similar to estoppel; and was originally founded
upon the desire of the courts to prevent circuity of action.
For it was said, if the heir were allowed to recover, the grantee
could immediately bring action on his warranty to recover the
land or restore its value; so the warranty was given effect by
what was called rebutter. But such was not the narrow scope
of estoppel: it did not depend on any warranty, the presence
of which, as has been stated, operated by rebutter, but oper.
ated by matter of record, matter of deed or matter in pais, and
was called a "conclusion;" "because a man's own act or ac-
ceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to allege or plead
the truth."
Our concern here is by matter of deed, and quoting from
Bigelow, "may be defined in a strict sense to be right based
upon a preclusion against the competent parties to a valid in-




strument and their privies to deny its force and effect by evi-
dence of inferior solemnity." And, as stated by Rawle, this
was the ordinary and personal effect of an estoppel by deed.,
But it had also a much higher operation which was, in certain
and exceptional cases, actually to transfer and pass an estate,
so that if a man conveyed to another land to which he had no
title, any after-acquired title would inure to the latter by
direct operation of law, and become vested in him in the same
manner as if it had originally passed to him by the assurance.
We see that such application of the doctrine of estoppel
was only allowed in cases of feoffment, fines and common re-
coveries. What about this doctrine under the later modes of
conveyances that operated by virtue of the statute of uses,
such as grant, release, bargain and sale? We find that at
common law they never had the effect of passing any estate
only that which the grantor actually had.7 Modern convey-
ances which take effect by virtue of the statute of uses, deeds
of bargain and sale, lease and release, pass no more than the
grantor actually had and cannot work by estoppel any more
than at common law. This is brought out with force and
clarity of language in Judge Porter's opinion in McCuster v.
McEvey, supra. He says:
"But this estoppel applied in the old law only to fines, com-
mon recovery, judgments and feoffments, which, as we have
said, were of presumed notoriety, but not to any conveyances
which originated under the statute of uses, such as grant,
lease and release, bargain and sale."
Now, just wherein courts have tried to give the doctrine
of estoppel any basis other than in'equity, is our immediate
inquiry. It is the theory of many courts and text authorities
that there has been an unconscious application of the com-
mon law doctrine of rebutter which arose from the covenants
of warranty applied to our present day conveyances; for, as
said by Rawle, there is no authority in any of the English
7. Rawle, Cov. for Title, page 362; 2 Smith's Leading cases, p. 2109.
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books to the effect that any mode of conveyance except feoff-
ment, fine and common recovery actually had the force of
passing after-acquired title and make estoppel." However,
we find courts searching for a sound basis to reason from, and
make the estoppel depend on whether or not the deed con-
tained a covenant; and if so, whether that covenant is one on
which an action would lie by the granteeg And when that
was determined, estoppel was allowed to avoid circuity of ac-
tion.10 But to base estoppel on avoiding circuity of action can-
not wholly be well founded; because we find that there are
cases where estoppel is allowed even though there could not
have been an action on the covenant of warranty.1
As said by the Court in Hill v. West,12 these decisions may
not seem by to be founded upon the reasons which are usually
assigned why the covenants in a deed should operate by way
of estoppel-that is, to prevent circuity of action; still they
seem to us to be reasonable and such as tend to furtherances
of justice; and when a married woman undertakes in conjunc-
tion with her husband to convey her land with covenants of
warranty, it is sufficient to protect her from the payment of
damages for breach of those covenants; for all purposes they
should be operative." Here we see that the doctrine of estoppel
does not rest upon avoiding circuity of action by the test of
whether or not there is an action for damages on the covenant;
as said in the case, "it is sufficient to protect her from paying
the damages for breach of covenant." That is, the law does
not allow an action against her for breach of covenants but
does allow estoppel; and there are several other exceptions
to the rule that there can be no estoppel where there is no ac-
tion on the covenant. 18
8. Rawle, Covenants for Title, pages 364, 416; Doe v. Oliver; 2 Smith's
Leading Cases, page 1991.
9. 143 Mass. 232.
10. Rawle, Cov. for Title, p. 397.
11. 1 Ore 328; 56 Ind. 1; 13 John. 463.
12. 8 Ohio .226.




But it has become well settled by a trend of decisions in
this country, even though it is not a well-settled principle of
the common law, that a general warranty in a conveyance will
estop the grantor and his heirs from setting up an after-
acquired title; and has the actual effect of transfering the
estate, excepting the cases that make distinction on kinds of
covenants, and on statutory covenants implied from the words
grant, bargain and sell.14 In Missouri's such covenants im-
plied from grant, bargain and sell, do not operate as the an-
cient law of warranty to transfer an after-acquired title to the
covenantee. It is, however, otherwise in Illinois.'0  But all
the cases that have based the test of estoppel on the force of
the covenant of warranty, and those that have held that only
certain kinds of warranty are good to effect estoppel,17 would
seem to be of no effect according to the case of Van Rensselear
v. Kearney,"'8 for that case goes so far as to hold that estoppel
will be allowed "although it may not contain any covenants of
title in the technical sense of the term, still the legal operation
and effect of the instrument will be as binding upon the
grantor and those claiming under him, in respect to the estate
thus described, as if a formal covenant to that effect had been
denying that he was seized of the particular estate at the time
of the conveyance." Then it appears that a warranty in a
deed being the determining element to effect estoppel has
disappeared.' 9
It has been the object thus far to point out that the doctrine
of estoppel by deed in after-acquired title has no sound basis
in the old common law and does not naturally or logically, ac-
cording to the purpose of those conveyances, follow; and that
courts have more or less searched in vain beyond the instances
of avoiding circuity of action (because such warranty en-
14. 18 Mo. 531; 10 Minn. 141.
15. 18 Mo. 531.
16. 32 111. 348; 24 Iil. 525.
17. 143 Mass. 232; 35 Minn. 509.
18. 11 Howd. 297.
19. Duchess of Kingston Case; 2 Smith's Leading Cases, page 2109 (9th ed.).
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titled the grantee to action for damages) and have blindly ap-
plied a doctrine of equity through the medium of common law
courts. And it naturally leads us to the question, does an es-
tate actually pass by operation of law or is the grantor only
precluded from setting it up, and in law is left to his action
for damages; and that if his position has so been altered that
damages would not suffice he should go into equity for a decree
of specific performance.2 0 Because, certainly such instruments
of conveyance as are now in use did not nor do not possess
the high character of passing title to any property after-
acquired, when at the time of conveyance the grantor had no
interest whatsoever. We find that there is no instance in the
English books beyond those of feoffment, fine and common re-
covery that actually possessed the high power of actually
transferring the title by operation of law, and therefore are
lead to the conclusion, as said by Rawle, "the doctrine by
which the after-acquired estate inures to the benefit of the
grantee is purely equitable, and when enforced by courts of
law is done so by administering equity through the medium
of common law forms; namely, by treating as having been
conveyed that which equity would decree to be conveyed, but
that apart from this, the prior grantee has no right which can
be enforced at law except by recovery in damages for breach
of the covenants he has received."2 1  As stated in the case of
Way v. Arnold,22 "this whole doctrine is most elaborately ex-
amined by Mr. Smith, page 454, in his leading cases and con-
tinued infinitum. And the conclusion of the whole matter is
that where lands are sold by any of the modern conveyances,
in which the. grantor had nothing at the period of executing
the deed, the title which he may subsequently acquire, does not
pass to the grantee by estoppel; nor entitle him to recover in
ejectment brought against a stranger. That a conveyance
made under such circumstances, does not debar the warrantor
20. 1 Ves. 409; 4 Simons 505.
21. Rawle, Covenants for Title, page 402.
22. 18 Ga. (1. c.) 192.
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or his heirs, from recovering under any right or title not
vested in the grantor at the time of making the conveyance;
that otherwise no estate would be safe from the fraudulent
sale of an ancestor or the prodigality of a son, etc." Then,
met by what is theoretically unanswerable, courts have fallen
back on precedents which have no ground in the law, and as
well said in McCuster v. McEvey,23 "The doctrine of these
cases, or the majority of them, however, has been impugned
by the American annotator of Smith's Leading Cases and by
Mr. Rawle, as based on a misconception of the English au-
thorities and erroneous in principle, the warranty being, in
their view, effectual only by way of estoppel or rebutter
against the warrantor and his heirs, but inoperative on the
after-acquired estate, and also as inconsistent, when applied
to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, which is
against the spirit and the purpose of the recording acts of the
several States. The argument in support of these views is
certainly very strong, if not theoretically unanswerable; but
the doctrine impugned has been so often and so fully recog-
nized in the courts and repeated in the text books, that we feel
bound, out of regard for the security of titles, to follow the
precedents."
Considering then, as we must, when we follow the applica-
tion of the doctrine of estoppel by the courts and its effect by
the learned authorities, that it is equitable when it is given the
effect of passing title in after-acquired estates, how do we ac-
count for its application in courts of law, unless it was uncon-
sciously mistaken to be a common law doctrine? This doctrine
can be wholly justified on the grounds of equity decreeing that
done which ought to be done, because it might be said that
equity is a panacea for legal difficulties. But the thing that
so shocks us is that courts are not conscious that it is equita-
ble, and not a common law doctrine, and apply it indiscrini-
nately in actions at law.
23. 19 R. I. 606.
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B. OPPOSED TO SPIRIT OF RECORDING ACTS.
Another thing which might be termed an objection to the
application of the doctrine of estoppel in after-acquired title,
is that it is opposed to the purpose and spirit of the recording
acts. In England they have no general recording system and
this would be no objection on that ground there, but in this
country we have the registry acts, which if given force and
effect would seem to make the estoppel by deed unnecessary
by charging with constructive notice all subsequent pur-
chasers who were so negligent as not to take advantage of
what the law has provided for their protection. By these acts
all instruments that affect any real property in law or equity
must be recorded, and are deemed to be constructive notice to
all subsequent purchasers.24 What else could be the purpose
of these acts if it is not to provide a means of investigating
the title of a pretending grantor. If he disregards it he is
deemed to take with notice, that is, whatever the records show;
and it seems the natural inference would be, that if the records
show nothing, he is deemed according to the spirit of the acts,
to have notice of the fact that his pretending grantee had
nothing to sell; because it is not provided that all instruments
affecting real property must be recorded. It is difficult to see
under these statutes how a man who has bought an estate to
which his grantor, at the time, had not title (for under the
law such grantee is deemed to have notice that his grantor had
nothing to sell), can inure to the benefit of the negligent
grantee, and thus estop privies of the grantor from setting up
the after-acquired title. As has been said, "It is agreed that
misrepresentation will estop the misrepresenter in whatever
department of the law the necessary conditions appear. Is it
too much to say that he who assists the misrepresenter will
also be estopped in whatever department of the law the neces-
sary conditions appear."" In other words, does he who dis-
24. R. S. Mo. (1919), Secs. 2198, 2199.
25. 5 Columbia Law Review, 261.
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regards the protection of the registry acts, and makes it pos-
sible for the misrepresenter to transfer that to which he has
-no title, become estopped when the grantor does afterwards
acquire title?
In the case of Way v. Arnold,20 one Pycheon having con-
veyed to the plaintiff a tract of land described it by a certain
plan. Later Pycheon acquired an adjoining tract and con-
veyed it to the defendants. Plaintiff claimed that part of the
second tract was included in the plan which described his
tract; and that as soon as Pycheon acquired the second tract
it inured to his benefit, and that the defendant is estopped
from setting up the after-acquired title to defeat the plain-
tiff. But the Court said and so decided: "We are strongly in-
clined to the opinion that our registry acts, under the modern
forms of conveyancing, are a virtual repeal of the doctrine of
estoppel. At any rate, it is quite clear that notwithstanding
Pycheon sold to the plaintiff with warranty and afterwards
bought the second tract, this after-acquired interest did not
feed the estoppel and pass the property in controversy imme-
diately to the plaintiff."
In the Missouri case of Dodd v. Wi~liams,27 the Court de-
ciding against the doctrine of estoppel in after-acquired title
say, "That where one has no title, sells with warranty, his
after-acquired title shall inure to his grantor so that not only
the grantor and his heirs, but all grantees are estopped from
claiming, irrespective of all questions of registry and notice,
seems a most inequitable application of the doctrine of estop-
pel, and it is no wonder that in recent cases courts have shrunk
from carrying the doctrine to such results."
JosEPH C. Lyoxs, '24.
26. 18 Ga. 192.
27. 3 Mo. App. 278.
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